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1 INTRODUCTION
The advent of theWTO in 1995 brought with it new disciplines on subsidies and,
in particular, agricultural subsidies. However, this was done in an unclear way. In
principle, agricultural subsidies might be regulated by the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), the Agreement on Agriculture
(Agriculture Agreement), or, in some cases, both.1
The difference is material. The SCM Agreement prohibits WTO members
from granting or maintaining import substitution subsidies and export subsidies,2
and from causing adverse effects to the interests of other WTO members through
the ‘use’3 of other subsidies.4 In addition, the SCM Agreement (together with the
GATT 1994)5 allows importing WTO members to impose countervailing duties
on subsidized imports that cause injury to their domestic producers. In contrast,
the Agriculture Agreement merely sets upper limits on the amount of
* Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge. This article is based on research undertaken at the
request of the Commonwealth Secretariat. I am very grateful to Christian Häberli, Gary Horlick
and Teddy Soobramanien for their comments. Opinions and errors are my own.
1 Article XVI of the GATT 1994 imposes additional disciplines on export subsidies, but in practice
an independent claim under this provision would be difficult to envisage: Richard H Steinberg
and Timothy E Josling, When the Peace Ends: The Vulnerability of EC and US Agricultural Subsidies to
WTO Legal Challenge 6 J. Intl. Econ. L. 369, 382–384 (2003).
2 Article 3 of the SCM Agreement. Article 27 of the SCM Agreement establishes certain exceptions
for developing countries.
3 EC and certain Member States – Large Civil Aircraft (Airbus), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 1 Jun.
2011, paras 662–663.
4 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement. Article 27 of the SCM Agreement establishes certain exceptions
for developing countries.
5 Part V of the SCM Agreement applies together with Art. VI of the GATT 1994. See WTO
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted 20 Mar. 1997, pp.
9–17. Article 27 of the SCM Agreement establishes different rules for products originating in
developing countries.
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trade-distorting subsidies.6 This makes it important to determine when, for any
given subsidy, the SCM Agreement or the Agriculture Agreement applies.
At least in relation to agricultural export subsidies, one might think that this
question has now been resolved by the WTO Nairobi Ministerial Decision on
Export Competition, which states that ‘[d]eveloped Members shall immediately
eliminate their remaining scheduled export subsidy entitlements as of [19
December 2015].’7 The reference in this Nairobi Decision to ‘scheduled export
subsidy entitlements’ seems to imply that the prohibition on export subsidies
under the SCM Agreement does not apply to scheduled agricultural export
subsidies. In addition, this Decision expressly exempts a number of scheduled
agricultural export subsidies from this obligation.8
Nonetheless, the legal status and effects of this Nairobi Decision are far from
clear. It does not purport to be an authoritative interpretation of the WTO
agreements, a waiver of obligations in those agreements or an amendment to those
agreements under Articles IX:2, IX:3 and X of the WTO Agreement respectively.
Nor would this Decision seem capable of overriding in any other way primary
WTO law applicable to agricultural export subsidies.9 At most, then, this Decision
can provide context for the interpretation of WTO law,10 or, perhaps, preclude
WTO members from making dispute settlement claims contrary to its terms.11
Turning then to the primary law, the key provision concerning the
relationship between the SCM Agreement and the Agriculture Agreement is
Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, which states as follows:
The provisions of GATT 1994 and of other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A
to the WTO Agreement [including the SCM Agreement] shall apply subject to the
provisions of this [i.e.Agriculture] Agreement.12
6 Article 3 and Parts IV and V of the Agriculture Agreement.
7 WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision on Export Competition, 19 Dec. 2015, WT/MIN(15)/45,
para. 6. Certainly, the WTO Secretariat seems to think this. In an unusually categorical statement,
given the legal uncertainty on the issue, it said recently that ‘[u]nder the current WTO rules,
sixteen WTO members are allowed to subsidize exports of certain agricultural products’. See
WTO Secretariat, Briefing note: Agriculture Issues, November 2015, at https://www.wto.org/english
/thewto_e/minist_e/mc10_e/briefing_notes_e/brief_agriculture_e.htm.
8 WTO Ministerial Conference, Decision on Export Competition, supra n. 7, footnotes 3 and 4
make an exception for certain subsidies for sugar, processed products, dairy products, and swine
meat, and the Decision also makes certain exceptions for developing countries.
9 Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU,
adopted 22 Dec. 2008, paras 391–393.
10 It could be a ‘subsequent agreement’ or ‘subsequent practice’ under Art. 31(3) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. See infra at text to n. 47.
11 Ibid., para. 228; Peru – Agricultural Products,WT/DS457/AB/R, adopted 31 Jul. 2015, para. 5.25.
12 Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement was formerly less important because of Art. 13 of the
same agreement (the ‘peace clause’). Article 13 provided expressly that, until the end of 31 Dec.
2003, certain types of agricultural subsidies were exempt from challenges under the SCM
Agreement and the GATT 1994. Article 13 is also referenced in Arts 5, 6 and 7 of the SCM
Agreement.
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Article 21.1 is a hierarchy rule, in the sense of a rule that determines which of
two ‘primary’ rules applies to a given fact.13 The following makes some general
comments about hierarchy rules in order to provide a conceptual framework for
understanding Article 21.1 as well as the Appellate Body’s various approaches to
this provision.
2 A TYPOLOGY OF HIERARCHY RULES
It is submitted that one can identify three main categories of hierarchy rules. First,
there are hierarchy rules that state that a primary rule applies (or, more commonly,
does not apply) to certain facts (usually, conduct). Thus, Article 1.5 of the TBT
Agreement states that ‘[t]he provisions of this Agreement do not apply to sanitary
and phytosanitary measures as defined in [the SPS Agreement]’.This category also
covers exceptions stating that ‘nothing shall prevent’ certain conduct or
‘notwithstanding’ a given obligation certain conduct is permitted. Such provisions
require a determination that a measure meets the given description; once that
determination is made, the rule automatically disables the application of any
contrary rule (typically, but not necessarily, an obligation).14 There is no need to
determine, for example, whether a given fact is legal under one rule but illegal
under another. Provided that the exceptions provision applies, the second rule will
not be relevant.15
Hierarchy rules in the second category operate by comparing the sets of facts
described by the two competing primary rules. The classic example of such
hierarchy rules is the lex specialis principle, which operates by displacing a ‘general’
rule that describes a set of facts in favour of any ‘special’ rule that describes a subset
13 For the purpose of hierarchy rules, ‘facts’ can include both ‘brute facts’ such as things (e.g., fruit or
a ‘measure’) or conduct (e.g., the eating of apples or the adoption of a measure) and, to use
another concept, ‘institutional facts’ such as rules (e.g., a rule stating that eating apples is
prohibited). See G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts (1958) 18 Analysis 69 and Neil McCormick,
Law as Institutional Fact, 90 L. Q. Rev. 102 (1974). At a greater level of abstraction, one can
conceive of ‘facts’ for these purposes as the minor term in any legal syllogism (or an ‘if-then’
propositional logical formula) in which the major term is the rule, and the conclusion is a legal
outcome (typically a binary determination of validity or legality).
14 For an argument that a non-violation claim under Art. XXIII:1(b) of the GATT 1994 could
prevent the adoption or enforcement of a measure, see Lorand Bartels, The Chapeau of the General
Exceptions of the GATT 1994 and the GATS: A Reconstruction 109 Am. J. Intl. L. 95, 114 (2015).
15 Cf WTO Panel Report, EC – Tariff Preferences, WT/DS246/R, adopted 20 Apr. 2004, para 7.45,
stating that ‘as an exception provision, the Enabling Clause applies concurrently with Article I:1
and takes precedence to the extent of the conflict between the two provisions.’ The Enabling
Clause states that ‘[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement,
contracting parties may accord [certain described] differential and more favourable treatment to
developing countries’.
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of those facts.16 It will be noted that, whereas the first category of hierarchy rule
itself defines the relevant set of facts (albeit this can be contracted out to a primary
rule), for the second category of hierarchy rule, the two sets of facts are necessarily
defined by the two primary rules.
Both of these categories of hierarchy rules are to be distinguished from
hierarchy rules that operate by comparing the legal consequences of applying the
competing primary rules to the same fact. The primary examples of rules in this
category are those based on a ‘conflict’ between different provisions.An example is
the General Interpretive Note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement, which that
‘[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the [GATT] 1994 and a
provision of another agreement in Annex 1A . . . the provision of the other
agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict’. However, strictly speaking, it
cannot be said that provisions are ever in ‘conflict’ in the abstract.The ‘conflict’ is
between the two legal consequences of applying each provision to the same fact.17
But, what is a ‘conflict’ for these purposes? At a minimum, there will be a
‘conflict’ when one rule prohibits conduct that another rule requires. In this case,
the two results are in a logical contradiction: conduct cannot be both prohibited
and required at the same time. However, rules can also conflict in the absence of a
logical conflict.This is the case, for example, when one rule prohibits conduct that
another rule permits. It is logically possible to comply with both rules, namely by
refraining from that conduct. But doing so, nullifies the right established by one of
the rules.18 This is why it is wrong, as a general proposition of law, to limit legal
conflicts to logical conflicts.19 But, it is particularly wrong to do so in the WTO
16 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the International Law
Commission, Finalised by M Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 Apr. 2006, para. 57, citing Karl Larenz,
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 251–252 (Springer 1975).
17 Elisabetta Montaguti & Maurits Lugard, The GATT 1994 and Other Annex 1A Agreements: Four
Different Relationships? 3 J. Intl. Econ. L. 473, 476 (2000), say that the General Interpretive Note to
Annex 1A expressly states that ‘whenever compliance with one provision of an Annex 1A
Agreement would lead to a violation of GATT 1994 or vice versa – in other words, when the
two provisions are “mutually exclusive” – the Annex 1A Agreement prevails’. However, the
General Interpretive Note does not define ‘conflict’. See also Joost Pauwelyn, Cross-Agreement
Complaints Before the Appellate Body: A Case Study of the EC–Asbestos Dispute 1 World Trade Rev.
63, 81 (2002).
18 See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law Ch 4 (Cambridge U. Press 2003),
and Erich Vranes, The Definition of ‘Norm Conflict’ in International Law and Legal Theory 17
European J. Intl. L. 395 (2006).
19 Cf. Clyde Engineering Co Ltd v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466, 478, per Knox CJ and Gavan Duffy
J, stating that ‘[s]tatutes may do more than impose duties: they may, for instance, confer rights; and
one statute is inconsistent with another when it takes away a right conferred by that other even
though the right be one which might be waived or abandoned without disobeying’. For the
opposite view, see WTO Panel Report, Indonesia – Automobiles, adopted 23 Jul. 1998,
WT/DS54/R, para. 14.28 n 649 and WTO Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles,WT/DS34/R, adopted
19 Nov. 1999, para. 9.92–9.95. For a critique, see Pauwelyn, ibid.
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legal system, given that Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), prohibits findings, rulings and recommendations that ‘add
to or diminish’ both the rights and the obligations set out in the covered
agreements.
The difference between these categories can be illustrated by reference to the
rather unusual hierarchy rule in Article 1.2 of the DSU, which states that ‘[t]o the
extent that there is a difference between the rules and procedures of this
Understanding and the special or additional rules and procedures set forth in
Appendix 2, [the latter] shall prevail’.Textually, rules and procedures are ‘different’
when they describe different facts (i.e., conduct), and so Article 1.2 would
ordinarily fall into the second category of hierarchy rules as a rule that compares
the two sets of facts described in the respective primary rules (but without
requiring that these facts comprise a set/subset dyad, as for the lex specialis rule). In
Guatemala – Cement I, however, the Appellate Body said that ‘[a] special or
additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in
a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the
other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.20 In other words, it
saw Article 1.2 of the DSU as a rule requiring a comparison of the legal
consequences of applying a rule to one of those facts, and thereby falling into the
second category of rules described above.
In summary, there are three main categories of hierarchy rule. One is based on
a simple description of a fact, and states that when that fact exists a given rule
applies (or does not apply). Exceptions fall into this category.A second is also based
on facts, but operates by comparing the facts described by the two competing
primary rules.This is where the lex specialis rule is to be found.And both of these
categories must be distinguished from a third category of hierarchy rules, which
operates by comparing the legal consequences of applying the two primary rules
to the same fact.This is where conflicts rules are located.
3 ARTICLE 21.1 OF THE AGRICULTURE AGREEMENT
These different types of hierarchy rule having been set out, it is possible to address
Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, and in particular what it means for the
SCM Agreement to be ‘subject to’ the provisions of the Agriculture Agreement.As
20 WTO Appellate Body Report, Guatemala – Cement I, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 Nov. 1998,
para. 65. The Appellate Body was concerned to establish a unified dispute settlement system for all
measures: ibid., para. 66. Note also that the reference to ‘adherence’ indicates that the Appellate
Body might have understood the concept of legal conflict to include situations in which a right
overrides an obligation: see Lorand Bartels, Treaty Conflicts in WTO Law – A Comment on William J
Davey’s Paper ‘The Quest for Consistency’ in At the Crossroads: The World Trading System and the Doha
Round 138–142 (Stefan Griller ed., Springer 2008).
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will be seen, the Appellate Body has adopted a variety of different approaches to
this question, sometimes virtually simultaneously.
The first Appellate Body report to consider Article 21.1 was EC – Bananas III
(1997). The question was whether the prohibition on quantitative restrictions on
goods in Article XIII GATT 1994 was ‘subject to’ Article 4.1 of the Agriculture
Agreement.The Appellate Body said:
[T]he provisions of the GATT 1994 . . . apply to market access commitments concerning
agricultural products, except to the extent that the Agreement on Agriculture contains
specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter.21
The Appellate Body continued:
[W]e do not see anything in Article 4.1 to suggest that market access concessions and
commitments made as a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture can be
inconsistent with the provisions of Article XIII of the GATT 1994. There is nothing in
Articles 4.1 or 4.2, or in any other article of the Agreement on Agriculture, that deals
specifically with the allocation of tariff quotas on agricultural products. If the negotiators
had intended to permit Members to act inconsistently with Article XIII of the GATT
1994, they would have said so explicitly.22
The Appellate Body here seemed to adopt several different hierarchy rules. In
the first of these quoted paragraphs, and in the second sentence of the second, it
seemed to adopt a hierarchy rule falling in the second category identified above.
That is to say, it saw Article 21.1 as a lex specialis test involving ‘institutional facts’,
namely rules governing tariff quotas on agricultural products,23 the implication
being that if those rules are more detailed in the Agriculture Agreement than
equivalent rules in the GATT 1994, they will be considered more ‘specific’ and
will prevail over those other rules. (The reason for saying ‘seemed’ is that it is also
possible that such rules would conflict with each other, which would involve
hierarchy rule in the third category identified above. It was unnecessary to
consider this possibility.)
In contrast, the first and third sentences of the second quoted paragraph
indicate a conception of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement as a hierarchy
rule falling in the first category identified above. It stated that Article 21.1 requires
an indication in the Agriculture Agreement that a prohibition in another
agreement would be disabled for a certain type of measure, in other words, an
exception.The Appellate Body elaborated with two examples.
21 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 Sep. 1997, para.
155. This phrase, ‘specific provisions dealing specifically with the same matter’, is frequently cited
in this context, although with different meanings.
22 Ibid., para. 157.
23 On this type of ‘institutional fact’, see supra n. 13.
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The first of these examples was Article 5 of the Agriculture Agreement.The
Appellate Body said that:
Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture allows Members to impose special safeguards
measures that would otherwise be inconsistent with Article XIX of the GATT 1994 and
with the Agreement on Safeguards.24
The second example was Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement, which,
disables dispute settlement actions based on Article XVI of the GATT 1994 or
Part III of the SCM Agreement (but not Article XIII of the GATT 1994) in
respect of certain measures during the implementation period.25
In sum, in EC – Bananas III the Appellate Body seems to have identified
Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement in terms of two different types of
hierarchy rule. First, Article 21.1 could be seen as a lex specialis rule triggered by
more ‘specific’ (i.e., detailed) rules on the allocation of agricultural quotas in the
Agriculture Agreement. Second, Article 21.1 could be seen as reinforcing any
provision in the Agriculture Agreement that disables rules in another agreement in
respect of certain measures.
In Chile – Price Band System (2002), the Appellate Body adopted another type
of hierarchy rule. The question in this case was whether, for the purposes of
determining the order of analysis, the first sentence of Article II:1(b) GATT was
‘subject to’ Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement.26 The Appellate Body said:
Article 4.2 prevents WTO Members from circumventing their commitments on ‘ordinary
customs duties’ by prohibiting them from ‘maintaining, reverting to, or resorting to’
measures other than ‘ordinary customs duties’.The first sentence of Article II:1(b) of the
GATT 1994 also deals with ‘ordinary customs duties’, by requiring Members not to impose
‘ordinary customs duties’ in excess of those recorded in their Schedules. Thus, the
obligations in Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture and those in the first sentence of
Article II:1(b) of the GATT both deal with ‘ordinary customs duties’ and market access for
imported products. As we see it, the difference between the two provisions is that Article
24 WTO Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, supra n. 21, at para. 157. In fact, Art. 5 of the
Agriculture Agreement does not say anything about measures that would be inconsistent with
Art. XIX of the GATT 1994 or the Safeguards Agreement. Art. 5.8 is the only part of Art. 5
that refers to Art. XIX of the GATT 1994 and the Safeguards Agreement, and this paragraph
does not say whether a special safeguard measure would be inconsistent with Art. XIX of the
GATT 1994 or the Safeguards Agreement. It states, rather, that in respect of certain special
safeguard measures WTO members will not exercise their rights to suspend concessions in
response. The Appellate Body’s description better suits Art. 5.1, which states that special safeguard
measures may be taken ‘notwithstanding’ the obligation in Art. II:1(b) of GATT 1994 (but not
the other provisions cited by the Appellate Body).
25 The rights to bring actions based on these provisions are contained in Art. XXIII GATT 1994
and the DSU. The Appellate Body was technically inaccurate when it said that Art. 13 provides
that ‘Members may not bring dispute settlement actions under either Article XVI of the GATT
1994 or Part III of the [SCM Agreement]’ (emphasis added).
26 WTO Appellate Body Report, Chile – Price Band System, WT/DS207/AB/R, adopted 23 Oct.
2002. At stake was the order of analysis as between the two agreements.
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4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture deals more specifically with preventing the
circumvention of tariff commitments on agricultural products than does the first sentence of
Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994.27
Here the Appellate Body decided that Article 4.2 was more specific than the
equivalent GATT 1994 provisions28 because it concerns agricultural products,
whereas the GATT concerns all products, including agricultural products.This is a
very simple version of the lex specialis principle in which the ‘brute facts’ in the
Agriculture Agreement are a subset of the ‘brute facts’ in the SCM Agreement.29
It would follow that, on this basis, the Agriculture Agreement will always be more
‘specific’ than the otherWTO agreements.
Probably for this reason, this approach has not been followed in subsequent
Appellate Body jurisprudence. In US – Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body
endorsed the Panel’s statement that Article 21.1 would apply in the following three
situations:
[W]here . . . an explicit carve-out or exemption from the disciplines in Article 3.1(b) of
the SCM Agreement existed in the text of the Agreement on Agriculture. . . . [W]here it
would be impossible for a Member to comply with its domestic support obligations under
the Agreement on Agriculture and the Article 3.1(b) prohibition simultaneously. . . . [W]here
there is an explicit authorization in the text of the Agreement on Agriculture that would
authorize a measure that, in the absence of such an express authorization, would be
prohibited by Article 3.1(b) of the SCMAgreement.30
The first and third of these situations are the same as one of the situations
mentioned in EC – Bananas III, namely where a provision in the Agriculture
authorizes a measure that would be prohibited in another agreement (i.e., an
exception). The second involves hierarchy rules of the third category based on
logical contradiction and legal conflict (i.e., respecting rights as well as obligations).
But then, interestingly, the Appellate Body added that ‘[t]here could
be . . . situations other than those identified by the Panel where Article 21.1 of the
Agreement on Agriculture may be applicable’.31 It elaborated as follows:
27 Ibid., para. 187. This passage was quoted and its result followed in WTO Panel Report, Peru –
Agricultural Products,WT/DS457/R, adopted 31 Jul. 2015, paras 7.19–7.20.
28 In fact, Art. 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement does not concern ordinary customs duties but
rather other measures that, by definition, are precisely not ordinary customs duties, because they are
required by this provision to be converted into ordinary customs duties. The equivalent rules in
the GATT 1994 would probably be the second sentence of Art. II:1(b), which governs ‘all other
duties and charges’, Art. XI:1, which governs quantitative restrictions, and Art. III, which establishes
an obligation not to discriminate against imported products.
29 See supra n. 13.
30 WTO Panel Report, US – Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, adopted 21 Mar. 2005, as modified by
the Appellate Body Report, para. 7.1038.
31 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 21 Mar. 2005,
para. 532.
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It may well be that a measure that is an import substitution subsidy could fall within the
second sentence of paragraph 7 [of Annex 3 of the Agriculture Agreement] as ‘[m]easures
directed at agricultural processors [that] shall be included [in the AMS calculation] […]’.
There is nothing, however, in the text of paragraph 7 that suggests that such measures,
when they are import substitution subsidies, are exempt from the prohibition in Article
3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.32
How is one to interpret this passage? On the one hand, the Appellate Body
might simply have been describing the types of hierarchy rules that have already
been discussed, and this explains the Appellate Body’s approach to Article 6.3 of
the Agriculture Agreement.33 However, another intriguing possibility emerges
from its treatment of United States’ argument concerning paragraph 7 of Annex 3
of the Agriculture Agreement. The United States had argued that this provision
would have no meaning if it did not establish a right to adopt import substitution
subsidies.34 The Appellate Body disagreed that this was the case, but in doing so, it
appeared to agree with the assumption that Article 21.1 would be triggered by a
provision in the Agriculture Agreement that would otherwise have no meaning.35
Such a rule would fall into the third category of hierarchy rules mentioned above
but, importantly, without requiring a determination that a given fact is expressly
permitted under one of the primary rules: it is sufficient if it is not prohibited.
The last case to consider Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement is EC –
Sugar Subsidies (2005), decided a month after US – Upland Cotton (2005). The
Appellate Body said:
Members explicitly recognized that there may be conflicts between the Agreement on
Agriculture and the GATT 1994, and explicitly provided, through Article 21, that the
Agreement on Agriculture would prevail to the extent of such conflicts. Similarly, the
General interpretative note to Annex 1A to theWTO Agreement states that ‘[i]n the event
of conflict between a provision of the [GATT 1994] and a provision of another agreement
in Annex 1A ..., the provision of the other agreement shall prevail to the extent of the
conflict.’ The Agreement on Agriculture is contained in Annex 1A to the WTO
Agreement.36
The analogy offered here with the conflicts rule in the General Interpretive
Note indicates that Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement requires a
determination of the legality of a subsidy under the Agriculture Agreement and
under the GATT 1994 respectively, and it is only when these outcomes are in
32 Ibid., para. 541.
33 Ibid., paras 543–545.
34 Ibid., para. 542.
35 Ibid.
36 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Sugar Subsidies, WT/DS265/AB/R, adopted 19 May 2005,
para. 221.
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‘conflict’ that Article 21.1 will apply in favour of the relevant provision of the
Agriculture Agreement.
SUMMARY
The Appellate Body has offered several different interpretations of Article 21.1 of
the Agriculture Agreement. It has seen Article 21.1 as a rule in the first category of
hierarchy rules mentioned above, and it has done so in two ways. The Appellate
Body has said that Article 21.1 is a rule triggered by a provision in the Agriculture
Agreement that expressly disables a contrary provision in one of the competing
agreements, such as Articles 537 and 13 of the Agriculture Agreement (EC –
Bananas III; US – Upland Cotton); but, significantly, it has also seen Article 21.1 as
triggered by a provision in the Agriculture Agreement that would otherwise be
rendered inutile by a rule in a competing agreement (US – Upland Cotton).
The Appellate Body has also seen Article 21.1 as a hierarchy rule falling in the
second category, which is to say one that requires a comparison between the facts
described in the competing primary rules. It has also done this in two main ways,
depending on the ‘facts’ that it has considered relevant. In this context, it will be
recalled that ‘facts’ for this purpose can be of any type; the only condition is that
they are described by a primary rule.
Thus, the Appellate Body has seen Article 21.1 as a lex specialis rule favouring
the Agriculture Agreement because this agreement contains rules concerning
agricultural products, whereas the GATT 1994 contains rules concerning all
products (Chile – Price Band System). On the other hand, the Appellate Body has
seen Article 21.1 as a lex specialis rule favouring the Agriculture Agreement because
the rules in that agreement covering agricultural products are more ‘specific’ than
the equivalent rules in the GATT 1994 covering the same products (EC – Bananas
III).There are problems with both of these approaches.The problem with the first
is that the Agriculture Agreement would always have priority over the GATT
1994, which does not seem to have been a popular conclusion.The problem with
the second is that, in practice, not many rules in the Agriculture Agreement are
obviously more ‘specific’ than an equivalent rule in the GATT 1994.38 Article 13
of the Agriculture Agreement is a rare example of a rule that could be seen this
way.
Finally, the Appellate Body has seen Article 21.1 as a hierarchy rule of the
third kind, which is to say one that is triggered by a conflict between the
37 But, as noted supra n. 24, this would be Art. 5.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, not Art. 5.8, to
which (by implication) the Appellate Body was referring.
38 Again, the Appellate Body’s own example was not convincing, as discussed supra n. 24.
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Agriculture Agreement and another relevant agreement (US – Upland Cotton; EC
– Sugar Subsidies). In principle, this is unproblematic, but for the practical difficulty
that the Agriculture Agreement does not contain many express rights that conflict
with the other agreements, once one discounts exceptions, which are more
properly seen as rules falling into the first category of hierarchy rules.
4 AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES UNDER THE AGRICULTURE
AGREEMENT AND THE SCM AGREEMENT
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The range of interpretations given to Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement
makes it somewhat difficult, in theory, to determine when that agreement will
prevail over the SCM Agreement. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw some
conclusions, based on these different interpretations.
4.2 IMPORT SUBSTITUTION SUBSIDIES
In US – Upland Cotton, the Appellate Body decided that the Agriculture
Agreement does not override the prohibition in the SCM Agreement on import
substitution subsidies: the Agriculture Agreement contained no provision
establishing a right to adopt such measures or that would have been rendered
inutile by the SCM Agreement.39
4.3 EXPORT SUBSIDIES
In relation to export subsidies, the key provision is Article 8 of the Agriculture
Agreement, which states that WTO members agree ‘not to provide export
subsidies otherwise than in conformity with [the Agriculture Agreement]’.40 Some
authors have said that this amounts to an ‘explicit authorization’ of conforming
agricultural export subsidies41 or that ‘it is patent that the URAA allows Members
to use export subsidies under precisely defined conditions’.42 This goes too far.
There is nothing explicit or patent about Article 8. However, there are reasons why
39 See supra at text to nn. 35–35.
40 Article 3.3 of the Agriculture Agreement also prohibits unscheduled agricultural export subsidies.
41 Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 328 (Cambridge U.
Press 2014).
42 Didier Chambovey, How the Expiry of the Peace Clause (Article 13 of the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture) Might Alter Disciplines on Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Framework 36 J. World Trade
305, 347 (2002).
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Article 8 might nonetheless prevail over the prohibition on export subsidies in the
SCM Agreement.
It could namely be argued that Article 8 would be rendered inutile if it did
not authorize subsidies that are in conformity with the Agriculture Agreement.43
Unlike the situation in relation to import substitution subsidies, the SCM
Agreement prohibits export subsidies regardless of whether they conform to the
Agriculture Agreement. As a result, it can be said that Article 8 would have no
meaning if it did not immunize export subsidies from this prohibition. If so, then
on the interpretation of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement implicitly
adopted by the Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton,44 export subsidies that
conform to the Agriculture Agreement must be permitted.
Such a reading is also supported by the 2015 Nairobi WTO Ministerial
Decision, which, by requiring the elimination of some agricultural export
subsidies and expressly permitting the continuation of certain others, implies that
such subsidies are not already prohibited.45 Moreover, while, as noted above,46 this
Decision does not fall within the usual framework of WTO decision-making, it
may still have a bearing on the interpretation of Article 8 of the Agriculture
Agreement as a ‘subsequent agreement’ or ‘subsequent practice’ concerning that
provision within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) and (b) respectively of theVienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.47
Concerning the first option, the Appellate Body has previously considered a
Decision of a WTO Ministerial Conference and a Decision of the TBT
Committee to qualify as a ‘subsequent agreement’ regarding the interpretation of
WTO law. However, in the same context Appellate Body also stated that such an
agreement must ‘bear[…] specifically’ on the provision being interpreted; a vague
reference to whether a type of measure is permitted or not sufficient.48 Given the
absence of any reference in this Decision on Export Competition to Article 8 of
the Agriculture Agreement, it might be difficult to consider it a ‘subsequent
agreement’ bearing specifically on the interpretation of that provision.
43 Steinberg & Josling, supra n. 1, 377.
44 Supra at text to nn. 35–35.
45 Supra n. 7.
46 Supra text to nn. 9–9.
47 For examples of ‘subsequent agreements’ within the meaning of Art. 31(3)(a) VCLT, see WTO
Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 24 Apr. 2002, para.
268 (a WTO Ministerial Conference Decision) and WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II
(Mexico),WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 13 Jun. 2012, para. 372 (a TBT Committee Decision).
48 WTO Appellate Body Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, WT/DS457/AB/R, adopted 31 Jul.
2015, para. 5.103. The ‘bearing specifically’ language originates in WTO Appellate Body Report,
EC – Bananas III (Article 21.5 – Ecuador II), supra n. 9, para. 390. This condition may be stricter
than the norm: see, e.g., International Law Commission, Second report on subsequent agreements and
subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties by Georg Nolte, Special Rapporteur, Doc.
A/CN.4/671, 26 Mar. 2014, paras 4–19.
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This leads one to consider the second option, namely, whether the Decision
could constitute ‘subsequent practice’ regarding the interpretation of a treaty
provision.While the interpretive effects of ‘subsequent agreements’ and ‘subsequent
practice’ are essentially the same, it would appear that they differ formally insofar as
the subsequent practice does not require the express reference to the provision
being interpreted. In US – Gambling, the Appellate Body said that ‘(i) there must
be a common, consistent, discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii)
those acts or pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the
relevant provision.’49 Subsequent practice may also constitute an understanding
that a certain provision does not relate to certain facts. For example, in its advisory
opinion on NuclearWeapons the International Court of Justice said that the parties
to relevant international instruments had, in their practice, shown their
understanding that the term ‘poison or poisoned weapons’ did not include nuclear
weapons.50 It is therefore possible to consider the Nairobi Decision on Export
Competition, along with the series of previous instruments on the issue,51 as
subsequent practice evincing the common assumption – and therefore
interpretation – of all WTO Members that Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement
permits for the time being scheduled agricultural export subsidies (at the same
time, of course, as this Decision purports to require the elimination of at least
some of these subsidies). Consequently, as a result of Article 21.1 of the Agriculture
Agreement,Article 8 prevails over the prohibition on such subsidies in Article 3 of
the SCM Agreement.
4.4 ACTIONABLE SUBSIDIES
As mentioned, the SCM Agreement prohibits WTO members from granting
subsidies that cause ‘adverse effects’ to the interests of WTO members, and
(together with Article VI of the GATT 1994) permits WTO members to impose
countervailing duties on subsidies that cause ‘injury’ to their domestic industries.
The Agriculture Agreement does not contain any explicit right to adopt subsidies
49 WTO Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 20 Apr. 2005, para.
192. Emphasis added.
50 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, [1996] ICJ
Reports, paras 55–56. See ILC, Second report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice, supra n.
48, para. 12; Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
557 (Springer 2012).
51 WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 20 Nov. 2001, para. 13;
WTO General Council, Framework for Establishing Modalities in Agriculture, WT/L/579, adopted 1
Aug. 2004, Annex A, para. 17; the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration,WT/MIN(05)/DEC,
adopted 18 Dec. 2005, para. 6; and the WTO Bali Ministerial Declaration on Export Competition,
WT/MIN(13)/40, adopted 7 Dec. 2013, para. 2, (albeit para. 13 states that ‘the terms of this
declaration do not affect the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements nor
shall they be used to interpret those rights and obligations’).
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causing such ‘adverse effects’ or ‘injury’, but does it contain any provisions
concerning such subsidies that would be rendered inutile by the SCM Agreement?
Again, the most likely candidate is Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement. The
question then is whether all of the subsidies described in this provision will
necessarily cause adverse ‘effects’ to the interests of other WTO members or
‘injury’ to their domestic producers.That cannot be said with certainty; as a result,
Article 21.1 will not operate to give priority to Article 8 over these competing
provisions in the SCM Agreement.52
5 CONCLUSION
Article 21.1 of the Agriculture Agreement, which has governed the relationship
between the Agriculture Agreement and the SCM Agreement since the expiry of
the ‘peace clause’ at the end of 2003, has been given numerous different meanings
by the Appellate Body.
Some of these meanings appear to have melted away, at least for the Appellate
Body: for example, the idea, suggested in Chile – Price Band System, that the
Agriculture Agreement is more ‘specific’ than the GATT 1994 because it covers
agricultural products rather than all products. In contrast, Article 21.1 can be
understood to apply when the Agriculture Agreement explicitly displaces a
contrary rule in a competing agreement, or establishes an express right to adopt a
measure. Beyond this, significantly, US – Upland Cotton indicates that Article 21.1
also applies when otherwise a provision of the Agriculture Agreement would be
rendered ‘inutile’ by a contrary provision of a relevant WTO Agreement. This
reading is also confirmed by subsequent practice, notably, the 2015 Nairobi
Ministerial Decision on Export Competition, even as this Decision purports to
require the elimination of at least some agricultural export subsidies.
On this reading, one can arrive at the conclusion that agricultural export
subsidies that, in accordance with Article 8 of the Agriculture Agreement, conform
to the commitments of WTO members in the Agriculture Agreement remain
exempt from the prohibition set out in Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. In
contrast, as already decided, agricultural import substitution subsidies remain
prohibited under Article 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. Beyond this, agricultural
subsidies causing adverse effects to the interests of WTO members remain
actionable under Article 5 of the SCM Agreement, and agricultural subsidies
causing injury to the domestic industries of WTO members may be subject to the
imposition of countervailing duties by those members under Part V of that
Agreement, in conjunction with Article VI of the GATT 1994.
52 For the same result, see Steinberg & Josling, supra n. 1, 385 and Coppens, supra n. 41, 329.
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